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Background: This study assessed the quality, core and support functions of the integrated disease surveillance and
response (IDSR) system relating to 18 suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in the Brong Ahafo Region,
Ghana.
Methods: Data was collected on selected indicators of the surveillance system relating to 18 suspected cases of
EVD, from epidemiological week 19 to 45 of 2014. We conducted in-depth interviews with seven medical directors
and two district directors of health services, and also reviewed documentation on the implementation of the core,
support and quality functions of the IDSR system. We also monitored news in the media and rumours about EVD
within the community as well as in health facility surveillance registers.
Results: The study identified gaps in the implementation of IDSR relating to 18 suspected cases of EVD. Health staff
heavily relied on haemorrhage as the only symptom for detection of suspected EVD cases. Twelve blood samples
and a swab of secretions from the mouth of the thirteenth patient (who died) tested negative for EVD using PCR
assay in laboratory confirmation. The blood samples of three patients were discarded, as they did not fit the case
definition for suspected cases, whilst two refused for their blood samples to be taken.
The community-based surveillance (CBS) system has not been given a prominent role in EVD surveillance and
response, as demonstrated by CBS volunteers and health staff not receiving any training in these processes.
There was intense public interest in EVD in August and September 2014. That interest has since waned for reasons
that have to be formally ascertained. Unfounded fear of and anxiety about EVD still remain challenges due to a lack
of in-depth knowledge about the disease in Ghana.
Conclusion: Ghana has been one of the pioneers in the implementation of IDSR in Africa. Despite this, gaps have
been identified in the implementation of IDSR relating to EVD in the Brong Ahafo Region. To address these gaps,
the CBS system has to actively partner with health facility surveillance to achieve effective IDSR in the region.
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Background
The outbreak of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West
Africa has presented problems for disease surveillance sys-
tems in the sub-region, including in Ghana. The nature of
the outbreak is unprecedented [1] and has placed Ghana
among the 15 countries at risk of an outbreak [2]. The
health systems of these countries, with their numerous
problems and limitations, have no prior experience in deal-
ing with any outbreak of viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) on
this scale. The fact that only 12 countries have the requisite
capacity to conduct laboratory confirmation of EVD within
the context of IDSR for priority disease intervention show
the limitations of surveillance systems in Africa, including
those in West Africa [3].
Most preparedness and response measures in countries
such as Ghana which are unaffected by EVD have been fa-
cilitated by ‘international strengthening teams’ deployed
by the World Health Organization (WHO) to support
these countries assess and improve their operational readi-
ness for EVD to the greatest degree possible [4].
Since 1998, the WHO Africa Region (WHO AFRO)
adopted a strategy known as integrated disease surveillance
and response (IDSR) aimed at strengthening public health
surveillance and response to priority infectious diseases at
district level [5]. The IDSR process integrates surveillance
with laboratory support, and translates surveillance and la-
boratory data into specific public health action. Just like
other disease surveillance strategies, IDSR has five compo-
nents that can be monitored or evaluated using key indica-
tors to assess their effectiveness (namely their structure,
core functions, priority diseases for surveillance, surveil-
lance quality and support functions) [6].
However, the effective implementation of this strategy
in Africa is dependent on the combined implementation
of all strategic components of IDSR to include strong co-
ordination, efficient communication, laboratory capacity
for case confirmation and training of disease control offi-
cer, public health nurses, community health nurses, field
technicians etc. The availability of sustained and inte-
grated funding for training activities is also critical [7].
Ghana started implementing IDSR in 2002 [8] and pres-
ently has 20 priority diseases, which include VHFs (EVD
and others) under surveillance, with reports being sent to
the national surveillance department on a weekly basis [9].
The IDSR strategy in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana
consists of a community-based surveillance (CBS) system,
which includes 2,928 volunteers reporting unusual health
events from 3,292 communities, and a facility-based sur-
veillance system made up of 665 health facilities. Since2002, this surveillance strategy has been at the forefront of
guinea worm and poliomyelitis eradication efforts, and is
used for responding to diseases of epidemic potential includ-
ing VHFs, cholera and meningitis. The data from this sur-
veillance system is amongst others entered into a district
health information management system (DHIMS) for stor-
age and to be used by health managers to aid them in
decision-making relating to disease control and surveillance.
Since March 2014, when the WHO declared the EVD
outbreak [9], the Government of Ghana and its health
sector has announced and rolled out plans to prevent
and respond to any outbreak in the country. However,
there have been concerns raised by various stakeholders,
such as the Ghana Medical Association, that the country
is not adequately prepared to handle an EVD outbreak
should one occur [10].
According to the WHO, a country like Ghana, which
has no reported cases of EVD, has to put in place an alert
level surveillance system at major land border crossings
with already affected countries, airports, capital cities and
major health facilities [11]. It is therefore expected that
IDSR in Ghana and Brong Ahafo should enable public
health officers to identify an outbreak sooner and be
confident about which communities and areas need inter-
ventions in case of an EVD outbreak [12].
Though at risk for EVD, Ghana [2] has not yet reported a
confirmed case, but since March 2014 has started prepara-
tory activities in all regions including Brong Ahafo towards
forestalling or managing a potential outbreak. These activ-
ities have included raising public awareness about the dis-
ease, health worker capacity-building in contact tracing and
case management, and distribution of resources including
personal protective equipment (PPE) to designated health
facilities.
The goal of surveillance is early detection of cases and
outbreaks, rapid investigation and early laboratory con-
firmation of disease as case fatalities, especially for EVD,
have ranged between 25% and 90% during outbreaks
[13]. It is therefore critical for outbreak detection and re-
sponse that epidemiological data and methods are prop-
erly utilised, not only by surveillance and response
teams at district, regional and national levels, but also by
other stakeholders. Unfortunately there is little evidence
that the data are used by higher level technical and polit-
ical leaders to prioritise and plan more effective preven-
tion programmes and to allocate resources for improved
prevention [8].
Because Ghana and Brong Ahafo have no prior experi-
ence with EVD, the CBS component of IDSR has to be
given a prominent role as it helps to provide an active sur-
veillance system. In the case of EVD, it is the communities
that are best placed to detect and monitor any suspected
case, mobilise themselves for action and make requests for
assistance. Furthermore CBS is intended to improve public
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ities [14].
This study assessed the level of implementation of the
quality, core and support functions and identified the gaps
of the IDSR system relating to 18 suspected cases of EVD
in the Brong Ahafo Region, Ghana.
Methods
Study area
The Brong Ahafo Region lies geographically in the middle
of the Republic of Ghana. It has a population of approxi-
mately 2.5 million (see Figure 1). The vegetation in the re-
gion forms part of the forest belt of Ghana, and hunting and
sale of bush meat are major activities. There is a bat colony
(some of these bats have been found to harbour antibodies
of the Ebola virus) at Buoyem caves (a popular tourist attrac-
tion) located in the central part of the region [15].
Ill health and death of members in any community in
the region are surrounded by cultural rites and rituals that
involve close contact with the body and possibly fluids of
the sick or dead persons. The causes of many diseases in-
cluding infectious ones are shrouded in superstitious be-
liefs and community members are required by tradition to
visit or help nurse the sick.
Except for outbreaks of cholera in 2012 [16] and in 2014
[9], as well as isolated cases of cerebrospinal meningitis,West Africa Ebola Map
Figure 1 Map showing the location of the Brong Ahafo Region in relation
recorded.the region has not, in recent times, faced a major outbreak
of any bacterial or viral disease (including VHFs) with epi-
demic potential.
There are 665 health facilities in the region, including
29 hospitals with 1,200 beds. The 29 hospitals have wards,
known as fever or isolation wards, where between four
and 10 beds are reserved for patients with infectious dis-
eases such as tuberculosis (TB) and yellow fever.
The isolation wards are also where patients are admitted
and cared for during outbreaks of diseases with epidemic
potential such as meningitis and cholera. Except for in a
few instances, staff manning these wards does not have ad-
equate training in infection prevention practices.
Study design and data collection
This study was longitudinal in design and involved the
collection of surveillance data under the IDSR strategy re-
lating to 18 suspected cases of EVD that occurred between
epidemiological weeks 19 and 45 (the Ghanaian National
Disease Surveillance Unit produces a weekly bulletin to
report on priority diseases under surveillance throughout
the year [17]) of 2014. This period was chosen because it
coincided with when the first suspected EVD case was de-
tected and when a stakeholder called a meeting for the
formal training of contact tracing and clinical case man-
agement teams (these have been absent since activities onGhana (No case)
Brong Ahafo suspected Ebola
to Ghana, and West African Countries where cases of EVD have been
Issah et al. Infectious Diseases of Poverty  (2015) 4:17 Page 4 of 8EVD started in July 2014) for the region and districts. We
assessed IDSR using selected indicators of the core and
support functions and quality of surveillance systems re-
lating to EVD through in-depth interviews with health
managers and a review of documentation.
In-depth interviews were conducted with the medical
directors of seven hospitals that had been required, based
on geographical location or level of functionality, to desig-
nate places for isolation wards for suspected EVD cases.
In addition, we interviewed two district directors of health
services who had over 20 years experience in the health
system and were conversant with the start of IDSR in the
region approximately 10 years ago.
The elements of the core functions assessed were case
detection, registration, confirmation and reporting of cases,
as well as preparedness and response to the suspected
cases. The elements of the support functions assessed were
standards and guidelines, training, communication, coord-
ination, resources, monitoring and evaluation. The quality
of the system was assessed using the indicator for timeli-
ness of reporting suspected cases to the regional surveil-
lance unit (RSI).
A checklist was used to monitor rumours and news
about EVD in the 27 district health systems, on the inter-
net (one website namely www.ghanaweb.com), in news-
paper articles of two government-owned national dailies
(Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times), and from radio an-
nouncements, news and discussions by members of the
public on four local FM stations.Data entry and analysis
The data collected on the 18 suspected cases was put on a
line list and entered into an Excel worksheet (Microsoft
2010), with analysis then carried out. The responses from
the health managers were recorded in accordance with
the component of the surveillance system for which an-
swers were sought.
A tally sheet was used to record the number of news
items in the various media and on which aspect of EVD
it focused, acknowledging the reaction of members of
the public. The news items selected covered the period
from August to November 2014, and included any ru-
mours, public educational messages, announcements,
news bulletins or discussions about EVD and Brong
Ahafo. Items on EVD that did not specify Brong Ahafo
were excluded. We also reviewed surveillance system
documents for rumours. This data was manually ana-
lysed based on the frequency of news items or rumours
and the subject area of focus.
Permission and clearance for the study was sought and
subsequently granted by the Regional Health Research
Unit. Except where necessary, the data in the study has
been de-identified and client anonymity has been ensured.Results
In the period (epidemiological week 19–45) during
which we gathered data, 18 suspected cases of EVD were
reported; 17 were reported to the outpatient depart-
ments (OPDs) of six district hospitals and the regional
hospital, and one was found dead near a public lorry
park. All 18 cases had bleeding from one part of the
body as the common symptom suggestive of EVD. Four-
teen of the suspected cases were male, with the ages of
all cases ranging from four to 54 years.
We found that none of the 17 cases that reported at
hospitals were promptly identified as suspected EVD
cases on the OPD history table. Instead, this was done
after they had undergone various medical and nursing
procedures that demanded possible bodily contact with
health staff and other patients (in one instance, a health
worker decided to take a blood sample for testing after
he/she conducted a lengthy procedure of placing nasal
packs to stop epistaxis in a patient).
The medical directors of the seven hospitals confirmed
that there was no indication that guidelines and case defi-
nitions were being used to detect suspected EVD cases at
the OPDs as the first point of call in their hospitals.
The two district directors of health services claimed they
knew about IDSR and how it was started in the region, and
that it was an essential strategy to respond effectively to pri-
ority diseases under surveillance in Ghana. They were, how-
ever, worried that the situation pertaining to EVD was
different. One of the district directors remarked:
‘It looks like we are creating a different surveillance
system for EVD because five months after the
announcement of the outbreak, things are still being
done from the top and we do not even have the
knowledge of how to deal with a suspected case should
we come across one.’
A total of 15 blood samples from the suspected cases and
one mouth swab from the deceased case were collected for
laboratory investigations at the Noguchi Memorial Institute
for Medical Research (NMIMR) (designated laboratory for
laboratory confirmation of EVD and other VHFs). Thirteen
samples (72%) were finally transported to the laboratory.
Twelve blood samples and the mouth swab from the
deceased patient tested negative for EVD (see Table 1)
using PCR assay in laboratory confirmation at the NMIMR.
The remaining three blood samples were discarded upon
reassessment by medical officers within 24 hours as the
symptoms exhibited by the patients did not fit the case def-
inition for suspected EVD cases. The remaining two pa-
tients did not have their blood samples taken; one refused
citing cultural reasons, whilst the other absconded after
being told he was going to have to give a blood sample for
EVD.





Core functions 1. Case Detection No. of hospitals using case definitions to detect cases at outpatient departments
(Total n = 29)
0 29
2. Case Registration No. of hospitals using case based forms to register cases 8 21
No. of Suspected cases recorded in DHIMS 2 database 3 15
No. of hospitals recording cases in DHIMS 2 2 27
3. Case Confirmation No. of hospitals which have collected blood samples from suspected cases of EVD 7 22
No. of suspected patients with blood samples or swab collected for EVD 16 2
No. of samples confirmed negative 13 0





No. of districts with plans (Hospital plan inclusive)Total n = 27 27 0
No. of hospitals with designated isolation facilities 7 22
No. of hospitals with available IEC materials 29 0
6. Response and
control
No. of Districts with functional Epidemic preparedness committees 27 0
No. of hospitals with Personal protective Equipment(PPE) 20 9
No. of hospitals with non contact thermometers for patients 7 22
Support functions 1. Standards and
guidelines
No. of hospitals with standards and guidelines for surveillance of EVD 20 9
No. of hospital laboratories with SOP for collection, packaging and transport of specimen
to national laboratory
1 28
2. Training No. of districts with staff trained in IDSR of surveillance for EVD 0 27
No. of districts with community based surveillance volunteers trained in IDSR or
surveillance for EVD
0 27
3. Resources No. of districts with budget line for EVD in surveillance plans 27 0
Quality 1. Timeliness 1. No. of suspected cases of EVD reported to regional surveillance unit within 24 hours 7 11
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DHIMS database (one case in week 20 and two cases in
week 26), while only seven were reported to the RSI within
24 hours of being seen at the OPDs. In three instances, the
RSI obtained information about the suspected cases due to
rumours on the radio from two local FM stations, rather
than through the district disease surveillance units.
Only seven out of the 29 hospitals in the region reported
and investigated EVD cases despite the fact that IDSR
guidelines and case definitions of EVD were sent to them
by the RSI.
In terms of the quality functions of the surveillance sys-
tem, seven suspected cases (38.8%) were reported to the
RSI within 24 hours of detection.
The seven medical directors and two directors of
health services informed the research team that all 27
districts in the region were instructed to draw up EVD
preparedness and response plans, which included reviv-
ing their epidemic management committees. They were,
however, waiting for funding for almost six months after
the EVD outbreak was declared to put in place activitiestowards strengthening the IDSR system and to carry out
its core and support functions.
The seven hospitals had designated places as isolation
wards for suspected EVD patients, however, two hospitals
had initial problems as staff wanted the isolation wards to
be as far away as possible from the other wards for fear of
contracting EVD. This resulted in the EVD isolation wards
in those two hospitals being situated close to the mortuaries.
Five hundred pieces of PPE and 20 non-contact ther-
mometers were received from the Ministry of Health
and distributed to health facilities including those at
international border crossings with Cote d’Ivoire. New-
mont Ghana (an international gold mining company in
Brong Ahafo) also donated an assorted quantity of PPE
and other resources for use by the clinical case manage-
ment teams. Twenty hospitals reported having at least
five sets of PPE and seven had at least one non-contact
thermometer to screen suspected cases at the OPDs.
Information, education and communication (IEC) ma-
terials were sent to all 29 hospitals and 27 health man-
agement teams.
Issah et al. Infectious Diseases of Poverty  (2015) 4:17 Page 6 of 8All directors interviewed said the Public Health Unit
of the Regional Health Services had officially informed
them to intensify surveillance for EVD. None of them or
their staff had been given any formal training or re-
fresher training in IDSR, but they had attended sensitisa-
tion meetings on EVD held for stakeholders.
Formal training was yet to be conducted for a 15-
member regional clinical case management team and a
16-member surveillance and contact tracing team. None
of the 2,928 CBS volunteers in over 3,000 communities
received any formal training or sensitisation on how to
detect and report suspected EVD cases and help in con-
tact tracing if cases tested positive.
Communication facilities have been adequate to sup-
port the surveillance system. Within 24–48 hours of
receipt of the blood samples, the NMIMR provided feed-
back on the results via email or on the phone.
In terms of support functions, a coordinating commit-
tee made up of various stakeholders under the chair-
manship of the regional minister was set up to oversee
the whole surveillance and response procedure to any
possible outbreak. However, for the period under assess-
ment, no formal monitoring and supervision process
was conducted by the health system and stakeholders to
assess the effectiveness of the IDSR relating to EVD sur-
veillance in the region.
There were no rumours of a suspected case of EVD
officially logged in the rumour register of any health fa-
cility in the region as health staff verbally reported to
the next level but failed to document it. Furthermore, a
review of the documentation of the CBS registers also
showed that no rumours were reported or logged in.
The media and the general public used the hospitals as
their main source of information about suspected cases.
There were eight articles on EVD and Brong Ahafo writ-
ten in the period from August to September 2014,
sourced from the main website (www.ghanaweb.com).
The Ghana News Agency subsequently culled these.
One article included a story on a scare in the region due
to the bats in the Buoyem caves carrying antigens of EVD,
whilst another announced the death of a suspected case at
a public lorry park. Two articles focused on the state of
preparedness of the region to adequately respond to any
potential outbreak of EVD and another two were on the
results of laboratory tests for EVD carried out on the
blood samples sent to the NMIMR. One article was on ad-
vocacy, urging all stakeholders in the region to adopt ef-
fective strategies and collaborate closely to prevent and
effectively respond to any EVD outbreak. The last article
was on assurances by the Director of Public Health of the
Ghana Health Service to the people of the region that the
bats at Buoyem carried antibodies and not antigens for EVD
and urging the population not to panic. After September
2014, no article was sighted on the website in connectionwith EVD and Brong Ahafo. The two dailies published only
one of the stories that was sourced on the internet.
Between July and September 2014, public education
through the radio via jingles and announcements occurred
on a daily basis. Each FM station, on at least a weekly basis,
had a slot for discussions and phone-ins to deliberate on
public reactions and preparedness to EVD in the region.
Subject areas that attracted lots of comments were on
the state of preparedness of the region, fear and stigma-
tisation against suspected cases of EVD and what com-
munities were to do in the event a suspected case was
found in their community.
It was also found that the FM radio stations in their
quest to intensify public awareness about the disease
sought interviews with health facility managers. Judging
from the reactions during the phone-ins, these interviews
did little to reduce the fear, stigma and anxiety the public
had about EVD. The medical director of one hospital said
that clients refused to use services at its OPD for a whole
day for fear of contracting EVD due to the presence of a
suspected case at the same OPD the previous day.
The donning of PPE by health staff in order to take
blood samples from patients was the single most notable
thing that caused fear and apprehension amongst pa-
tients tagged as suspected cases, their relatives and
members of the public.
Discussion
An effective disease surveillance system is a prerequisite
to prevent or respond to an EVD outbreak in a country
such as Ghana, which is yet to report a confirmed case of
the disease. The unprecedented nature of this outbreak [1]
demands that the implementation of the core and support
functions of the surveillance system produce information
for decision-making to reduce the impact of any outbreak
on communities and their livelihoods.
Ghana was one of the first countries in Africa, to-
gether with Tanzania, to implement IDSR in the region
[18], which is supported by success stories of no cases of
wild poliovirus recorded since 2008 [19] and a process
towards certification as being guinea worm free since
2014 [20].
In this study, we acknowledge the limitations of the
methodology and the potential of bias. However, we pro-
ceeded with the study in order to document the activ-
ities surrounding the surveillance and response to 18
suspected EVD cases. Despite the limitations in our
methodology, one factor that guided us was our desire
to find home-grown answers and to revamp the coun-
try’s IDSR system to deal with a possible EVD outbreak.
The authors have no cause to doubt that the surveillance
system in the region would have reacted any differently to a
disease for which it has no experience dealing with. An-
other area in which we acknowledge weakness is the fact
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influenced by the public debate and reactions in Ghanaian
news media to a possible EVD outbreak.
This study identified gaps in the core, support and quality
functions of the IDSR system in the region. It found that
the over dependence of health staff on bleeding (haemor-
rhage) as the only symptom from which to classify a sus-
pected EVD case and non-utilisation of case definitions are
of serious concern in outbreaks as most infected patients
do not show haemorrhagic symptoms. Furthermore, the in-
adequate infection control precautions/barriers to nursing
procedures in most of the health facilities means that any
outbreak not detected and reported early can dramatically
amplify [13], with a single positive case possibly infecting
scores of people before being laboratory confirmed.
The focus on haemorrhage as the primary and only
symptom to diagnose a suspected EVD case could pos-
sibly explain why out of the 29 hospitals, a number of
health centres and in the 3,000+ communities, only seven
hospitals reported suspected cases in the study period.
The registration of suspected EVD cases suffers the
same fate as that of other priority disease under surveil-
lance, with only three out of 18 cases recorded in the
DHIMS database. Poor documentation of suspected cases
for a disease such as EVD, in which the region has no ex-
perience, not only robs the system of vital data for effect-
ive decision-making but also hampers efforts to maintain
public confidence in the disease surveillance system.
The timely collection, transport and testing of blood sam-
ples (72% of cases) and prompt receipt of test results shows
the essential role laboratory support plays in the implemen-
tation of IDSR in the region. This can possibly have a posi-
tive effect of boosting the confidence of both health staff
and the general public in the surveillance system and efforts
of health authorities to respond to EVD in Ghana.
The level of preparedness by the designation of seven iso-
lation facilities, and the distribution of IEC materials, PPE
and non-contact thermometers has not been matched by
the training of the health staff and CBS volunteers. This
piecemeal approach to IDSR that does not give prominence
to early formal training of health personnel and volunteers
gives room for eventual sub-optimal performance of the
surveillance system.
It has been recommended by other authors that training
should be combined with the implementation of other stra-
tegic components of IDSR. Of critical essence is the avail-
ability of sustained and integrated funding for training
activities [7].
Training should have been conducted very quickly at the
beginning in order to prepare volunteers to adequately carry
out community sensitisation and accurately record any com-
munity alert or suspected EVD case. Yet more than eight
months after the WHO declared the epidemic, no formal
training has been provided to the CBS volunteers. This lackof training has probably contributed to the non-recording of
any rumours associated with EVD by any of the volunteers.
With Ghana being one of the pioneering countries in
IDSR in Africa [16], it is unfortunate that its Brong Ahafo
Region has not utilised its experience to respond effectively
to the 18 suspected EVD cases and in the process the CBS
system has totally been forgotten. This needs to be reversed
as it is the CBS system which helps to provide an active
surveillance system because communities are best placed to
detect and monitor any suspected case of EVD, mobilise
themselves for action and make requests for assistance dur-
ing an outbreak [14]. Secondly, it is trained and dedicated
volunteers who will be actively involved in contact tracing
which is a critical element in averting spread of EVD to
other communities.
The intense media attention given to EVD in August and
September could have improved the public awareness
about EVD though this has not been formally documented.
The diverse nature of news items and discussions were,
however, not sustained probably due to lack of funding or
the proverbial Ghanaian shifting of interest onto more sen-
sational headlines in the political sphere.
In a society that is apprehensive and ready to stigmatise
patients with diseases of which they have little under-
standing, EVD joins HIV and TB on the list of the three
most feared diseases. Furthermore, the donning of PPE
and picking blood samples from patients with little con-
cern for privacy adds to the already existing fear, mistrust
and stigmatisation of patients amongst a public that has a
phobia for diseases in which bleeding is a major symptom.
One of the patients from whom a blood sample was taken
remarked:
‘I have seen pictures on television of people wearing
these dresses (PPE) and treating or burying people sick
from Ebola. What type of disease is this that everything
including the way the doctors dress reminds one only of
death?’ [male suspected case, 26 years old].
It is therefore not surprising that another patient, upon
seeing the health staff dressed in PPE, refused to give a
blood sample, whilst another simply absconded from the
hospital. This could be averted by ensuring more privacy by
having samples taken at places away from the prying eyes of
the public. Effective counselling provided to patients and
their relatives and ensuring confidentiality of the process are
two other ways in which this issue can be addressed.Conclusion
Ghana finds itself in a critical situation of having to con-
duct surveillance and response to a disease in which its
health system has no experience. Despite the vast experi-
ence of Ghana and Brong Ahafo in implementing IDSR,
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EVD remain.
Apart from improving the implementation of the core,
support and other functions of IDSR, the CBS system has
to be urgently brought into the mainstream of surveillance
activities for EVD and other diseases of epidemic potential.
The documentation of progress and gaps gives an op-
portunity to implement interventions to build a robust
and sustainable IDSR system. This is of special signifi-
cance as Ghana and the Brong Ahafo Region are yet to
record their first confirmed case of EVD.
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